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Abstract
We provide an explanation for why both college tuition and gov-
ernment grants to college students are typically means-tested. The
critical idea is that attending college is both an investment good and
a consumption good. The consumption benefit from education im-
plies that, when tuition and grants are uniform, the marginal rich
student is less smart than some poor people who choose not to attend
college, thus reducing the social returns to education and increasing
the college’s cost of education. Competition in the market for college
education results in means-tested tuition. In addition, to maximize
the social returns to education government should means-test grants.
We thus provide a rationale for means-tested tuition and grants which
relies neither on capital market imperfections nor on redistributive
objectives.
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1 Introduction
College tuition and government grants to students are commonly means-
tested.1 The literature offers three main arguments for this: capital mar-
ket imperfections, redistribution, and price discrimination by monopolistic
colleges. None of these arguments is fully satisfactory. First, rather than
means-tested tuition fees or grants, providing students with loans (with re-
payment conditional on future income) is the efficient (and possibly also more
equitable) way of dealing with missing capital or insurance markets (Jacobs
and Van Wijnbergen (2003)). Second, though optimal redistribution may
require means-tested grants (Dur, Teulings, and Van Rens (2004)), the re-
distribution argument cannot explain why private colleges in a competitive
education market charge different tuition to students with different incomes.
Third, it is unlikely that exploitation of monopolistic power by colleges can
fully explain why tuition varies with income. As Epple, Romano, and Sieg
(2004, p. 5) note, “The stylized fact that colleges can extract so much rev-
enue from higher income households is clearly an empirical puzzle given many
colleges competing for students. ... More future research is needed to find
other compelling explanations for this puzzle."
We provide a new rationale for why both college tuition and government
grants to students are means-tested. The critical idea is that attending col-
lege is both an investment which increases future earnings, and a consumption
good. One implication of the model is that a rich person of low ability may be
willing to pay more for college than would a poor person of high ability. Con-
sequently, when smarter students are less costly or otherwise advantageous
to colleges, in a competitive equilibrium colleges may charge poor students
a lower price than rich students. Moreover, when the social return to educa-
tion exceeds the private return, allocative efficiency may require government
grants to students to be means-tested.
The idea that education is not merely an investment but also provides
consumption benefits is widely acknowledged. As Heckman (2000, p.15)
notes: “There is, undoubtedly, a consumption component to education."
Some empirical evidence shows a consumption value of higher education.
Lazear (1977), using data on young males in the United States, finds that in-
1See the review of tuition policy and student support in 13 countries by the Irish
Department of Education and Science (2003). See National Center for Education Statistics
(2003) for detailed information about tuition and financial aid to students in the United
States.
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dividuals with much education (M.A.’s and Ph.D’s), push education beyond
the level that maximizes the present value of future income, suggesting that
education has consumption value. The reverse holds for lower levels of edu-
cation. Using Dutch data, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2000) find evidence
that schooling is a good that both generates utility and raises future income.
Alstadsæter (2004) provides evidence for Norway.
2 Literature
Since Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964) developed the theory of human capi-
tal, economists have neglected the consumption benefits from education. Two
exceptions are Alstadsæter (2003) and Malchow-Møller and Skaksen (2004),
who study optimal taxation and financing of education when education yields
both a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary return. Both papers employ a repre-
sentative agent framework and so abstract from heterogeneity in ability and
in wealth among agents, which are crucial features of our model. Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2003) allow for consumption benefits from education in a model
where agents have heterogeneous ability, but no wealth.
Our paper has some similarity with Wickelgren (2001). He argues that
given past discrimination, non-discriminatory employers or universities may
voluntarily practice affirmative action in their hiring or admission decisions.
The reason is that a person who overcame discrimination is likely more able
than someone in the same position who faced no such obstacle. Likewise, in
our paper, colleges charge lower tuition to poor students, who have higher
expected ability than the rich students they displace. This stems, however,
from the consumption benefit from education rather than from past discrim-
ination.
De Fraja (2003) argues that high-potential individuals from groups with
relatively few high-potential individuals (‘disadvantaged’ groups) should re-
ceive higher government grants, since grant provision to these groups entails
lower budgetary cost (lower inframarginal subsidies). As we shall see, such
a result also appears in our model, even when we assume that ability and
student’s wealth are uncorrelated. We identify two other reasons (which hold
even when the government budget constraint does not bind, and when infra-
marginal subsidies are inexpensive) for why government should give larger
grants to poorer people.
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3 Assumptions
College students differ in two ways. First, students differ in ability, denoted
by a. Second, at the start of their college career, students differ in wealth,
w. Each person knows his own ability, but the colleges and the government
do not; the colleges and government can only observe a student’s wealth.
We assume that students’ ability and wealth are distributed according to
the joint density function f(a,w). In Sections 4 and 5, we assume that the
distribution is uniform, that is, f(a,w) = f for all (a,w). Section 6 discusses
the implications of relaxing this assumption.
For simplicity, we consider a two-period model. In period 1 a person can
choose whether to attend college. In period 2, a person who did not attend
college has income a. A person who attended college earns a + p(a), where
p0(a) > 0: the return to college increases with ability.2 We also assume
p00(a) = 0. As we shall see, this assumption ensures that we can safely ignore
opportunities to work in period 1 for persons who do not attend college.
For simplicity, suppose consumption of goods occurs only in period 2;
since we assume perfect capital markets, that simplification does not affect
our results. Consumption in period 2 by a person with initial wealth w who
did not attend college is a+w. Let college tuition to a person with wealth w
be t(w). It follows that consumption by a person with initial wealth w who
attended college is a+ p(a) + w − t(w).
The utility from consuming goods is given by the function v(·), with the
usual properties v0(·) > 0, v00(·) < 0, and v000(·) ≥ 0. The consumption benefit
from attending college is b. This benefit can reflect the opportunities to date
members of the opposite sex, to enjoy the sports facilities, to take part in
the excitement of school football games, to live away from home, and so on.
For convenience, we assume that utility is separable in consumption goods
and the consumption benefit of education. Necessary for our results is that
education is not an inferior good.
The topic we address becomes interesting if a college prefers to enroll
smart students. This can arise for many reasons. 1) Peer group effects
within colleges can make increased attendance by smart students benefit all
other students (see Epple and Romano (1998)). 2) Faculty may find it more
pleasant or interesting to teach smart students, and so a college may attract
2Most empirical studies find complementarity between ability and education, see e.g.
Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003), Dur and Teulings (2004), and the studies men-
tioned therein.
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better faculty, or attract a given quality of faculty at lower cost, the better are
its students.3 3) Studious students may be less likely to engage in behavior
(such as drunkenness) which may impose costly legal liability on the college.
4) Attracting smarter students may enhance a college’s prestige.
We find that a simple but fruitful approach is to suppose that a college’s
costs decline with the quality of its students. Let a college’s cost of educating
a student with ability a be c(a), with c0(a) < 0. Throughout, we assume
perfect competition in the market for college education.
4 Market equilibrium
A student with ability a and wealth w attends college if:
v [a+ p(a)− t(w) + w] + b ≥ v(a+ w). (1)
Let a∗(w) denote the ability of a student with wealth w, who, in equilibrium,
is indifferent about attending college. In a competitive equilibrium, it holds
for all w that:
v {a∗(w) + p[a∗(w)]− t(w) + w}+ b = v[a∗(w) + w], (2)
t(w) =
R
a∗(w)
f(a,w)c(a)daR
a∗(w)
f(a,w)da . (3)
The first equation describes, for each level of wealth the students who
attend college. Since smarter students have a higher return to education,
p0(a) > 0, a person with wealth w and with a ≥ a∗(w) attends college.4 The
3At Yale University, the “faculty was astonished and delighted by the leap
in academic ability" of freshmen after it changed undergraduate admission poli-
cies in the 1960’s. See “The birth of a new institution: How two Yale pres-
idents and their admissions directors tore up the ‘old blueprint’ to create a
modern Yale" by Geoffrey Kabaservice, Yale Alumni Magazine, December 1999,
(http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_12/admissions.html)
4Allowing persons who do not attend college to work in period 1 changes equation (2)
to
v {a∗(w) + p[a∗(w)]− t(w) + w}+ b = v[2a∗(w) + w].
Under our assumption that p is a linear function of a, none of our results are affected.
When, however, p(a) is concave, the highest ability students may prefer working in period
1 over attending college, because their opportunity cost of education may exceed their
return to education. We abstract from this.
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second equation describes the equilibrium level of tuition. Perfect compe-
tition implies that tuition for a student with wealth w equals the expected
cost of educating a student with wealth w.
Consider first education with no consumption value, b = 0. Then, equa-
tion (2) reduces to
p[a∗(w)] = t(w). (4)
Therefore, a person will attend college only if the return to education is higher
than or equal to tuition. Using (3), we can verify that when b = 0, equilibrium
tuition is independent of wealth, t0(w) = 0. For suppose wealthier students
would pay higher tuition, t0(w) > 0. Then equation (4) would imply that a∗
increases with wealth w. Given that the distribution of ability and wealth is
uniform, this means that richer students would on average be smarter. As
c0(a) < 0, the right-hand side of equation (3) then implies that a college’s
expected average cost is lower when admitting richer students. Hence, if
t0(w) > 0, the expected cost per student declines with the wealth of the
student body, whereas tuition increases with student’s wealth. Clearly, when
t0(w) > 0, the zero-profit condition (3) is violated for some w. A similar
argument applies for t0(w) < 0, and for any other nonuniform tuition policy.
Only when tuition is uniform, t0(w) = 0, can the zero-profit condition hold
for all levels of wealth. With uniform tuition, the average ability of students
and, hence, the expected cost per-student, will be independent of the wealth
of students. So if attending college has no consumption value, tuition will be
uniform.
When b > 0, condition (2) implies that some students with p(a) < t(w)
attend college. Though this reduces their lifetime consumption of goods,
they enjoy the consumption benefit, b, of college.
Proposition 1: If college education has consumption value (b >
0), colleges charge higher tuition to richer students (t0(w) > 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. By the concavity
of v(·), the marginal utility of consuming goods declines with wealth, so that
a rich person is more willing than is a poor person to reduce consumption
of goods in return for the consumption benefits from education. With uni-
form tuition, the least able poor student in college will therefore be smarter
than the least able rich student. This also implies that poor students will
on average be smarter than rich students. As a college’s cost of education
declines with student’s ability, in the competitive equilibrium colleges charge
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lower tuition to poorer students. In equilibrium, the rich will nevertheless
be over-represented in college. For equal representation would imply equal
expected ability and, hence, uniform tuition in a competitive equilibrium.
In equilibrium, some persons who avoid college are smarter than some
who attend college. Since the smarter persons get a higher return from edu-
cation, aggregate output is higher when they attend college. When, however,
externalities are absent, the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. Forcing a poorer
but smarter person to replace a richer but dumber student at the same tuition
rate would reduce the utility of both students. Though the smarter person
would gain a higher rate of return and would enjoy the same consumption
benefit from education, payment of the tuition fee reduces the utility from
consumption goods of the poor student more than it reduces the utility of
the rich student.
Our explanation for means-tested college tuition contrasts with the idea
that colleges aim to attract poor and minority students for reasons of diver-
sity or of equity . Differentiation of tuition by colleges for these reasons could
make the average poor student in college less able than the average rich stu-
dent, and some current evidence shows that difference (Rothstein (2004)).
But other evidence shows, as our model predicts, that poor students en-
rolled in college are of higher average ability than rich students, and that
means-tested financial aid can increase the quality of the student body. At
a National Press Club event centered around the book America’s Untapped
Resource: Low-Income Students in Higher Education, a former College Board
official claimed that “The fact is, the dumbest rich kids have as good a chance
of going to college as the smartest poor kids."5 Consistent with this view, a
study by the Maryland Higher Education Commission found that commu-
nity college students who receive need-based financial aid perform as well as
or better than their wealthier peers. For example, 74.3 percent of the low-
income students who received financial aid returned for a second year of study
at their community college, transferred, or earned a credential, compared to
62.5 percent of non-recipients. Similarly, 40.5 percent of new full-time fresh-
man who received need-based financial aid transferred to a public four-year
institution and/or earned a community college degree within five years of
matriculation, as opposed to about one-third of non-recipients.6
5See National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, news release Jan-
uary 15, 2004, at www.NASFAA.org.
6See Janis Battaglini, “A comparison of the retention, transfer and grad-
uation rates of need-based financial aid recipients at Maryland public col-
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The history of means-tested financial aid at Yale University offers another
instructive example.7 In the Class of 1957, before Yale offered means-tested
financial aid and before it practiced needs-blind admissions, graduates of
private schools (who were overwhelmingly wealthy) constituted more than
60 percent of the Class of 1957. But they constituted less than half the
membership of Phi Beta Kappa (the most prestigious national honor society)
and one-sixth of the membership of Tau Beta Pi, the national engineering
honor society. The largest feeder schools (Andover, Exeter, Lawrenceville,
Hotchkiss, and St. Paul’s, all of which are private), sent about 20 percent
of the class; but each accounted for only one of the 64 members of Phi
Beta Kappa. Other traditional feeder schools such as Groton, Hill, Kent, St.
Mark’s, St. George’s, and Taft contributed no members to Phi Beta Kappa.
In 1963 Yale greatly increased its financial aid, and by 1966 adopted a
fully needs-blind admissions policy: the University no longer rejected quali-
fied applicants who could not afford Yale’s costs, eliminated any quota on the
number of scholarship students, and placed no limit on the amount of money
available for grants and loans. The class entering in 1966 was composed of
58 percent public school students, a higher percentage than ever before, and
a jump from 52 percent the previous year; financial aid jumped to nearly $1
million, 30 percent above what it had been the year before; gift aid from the
University increased by almost 50 percent. This class entered with higher
SAT scores than ever before; a student who scored its mean SAT verbal mark
of 697 would have been at the 75th percentile of the class that entered four
years before.
5 Government means-tested grants
So far, we ignored externalities of education. As a result, the market equilib-
rium is Pareto-efficient and government intervention is unnecessary. Suppose
now that, in addition to the private return p(a), there is a public return to
education λp(a). Of course, only the private benefits, not the social returns,
leges and universities with the performance of non-recipients," February 2004.
(http://www.mhec.state.md.us/higherEd/about/Meetings/EdPolicyMeetings/03-10-04/)
7The following is drawn from “The birth of a new institution: How two Yale
presidents and their admissions directors tore up the ‘old blueprint’ to create a
modern Yale,"by Geoffrey Kabaservice, Yale Alumnni Magazine, December 1999.
(http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_12/admissions.html)
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affect a person’s decision to attend college, or a college’s tuition policy. The
resulting underinvestment in human capital can be removed by subsidies. We
shall see in this section that the consumption benefit from education implies
that optimal subsidies will be means-tested rather than uniform.
One reason the social return to education may exceed the private return
is taxation. If each student ignores the effect of his education on govern-
ment’s tax revenues, and if the cost of education is not fully deductible
at the same rate as the returns to education are taxed, taxation results in
underinvestment in education (see, among others, Boadway, Marceau, and
Marchand (1996), Anderson and Konrad (2003), and Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2003)). Education can also generate externalities in production. For in-
stance, if innovation increases with the knowledge workers gained in college,
and innovations are afforded imperfect patent protection, then the private
return to education is less than the social return. Such externalities are an
important feature of models of endogenous economic growth (Lucas (1988),
Romer (1986), 1990)). Recent empirical evidence is provided by among oth-
ers Moretti (2004) and Teulings and Van Rens (2003), and surveyed in Sianesi
and Van Reenen (2003).
Consider a government that aims to maximize national output net of the
costs of college education. The government’s objective is thus
max
Z a∗(w)Z
f(a, w)adadw+
Z Z
a∗(w)
f(a, w)[a+(1+λ)p(a)−c(a)]dadw. (5)
Let government affect behavior by providing grants, g(w), to students, which
can be conditioned on their wealth. In equilibrium, students’ demand for
college education becomes:
v {a∗(w) + p[a∗(w)] + g(w)− t(w) + w}+ b = v[a∗(w) + w]. (6)
Tuition is still given by (3). For simplicity, we assume that the government
has a given budget, denoted by G, for student grants:Z Z
a∗(w)
f(a, w)g(w)dadw ≤ G. (7)
We will consider both a binding and a non-binding budget constraint.
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Consider first education which has no consumption benefit (b = 0). Then,
as we saw in the previous section, in equilibrium all persons whose return
to education exceeds the tuition attend college. Moreover, tuition is inde-
pendent of a student’s wealth and equals the expected cost of education.
Hence, if externalities are absent (λ = 0), optimal student grants are zero
(g(w) = 0 for all w). For providing grants would induce people whose return
to education is lower than the expected costs of college education to attend
college. When the social returns to education exceed the private returns
(λ > 0), optimal student grants are positive, so that students internalize the
externality of their education on national output. Optimal student grants
are independent of student’s wealth. If grants varied with student’s wealth,
students receiving high grants would on average be less smart than students
receiving low grants. This would result in lower output (since p0(a) > 0) and
higher cost of college education (since c0(a) < 0) than when the government
spends the same budget on uniform grants.
Consider next education which has consumption value (b > 0).
Proposition 2: If college education has consumption value (b >
0), optimal student grants are means-tested (g0(w) < 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 follows. The consumption benefit
from education implies that with uniform grants (or without grants) some
poor people not attending college are smarter than the least able rich student.
Since the return to education increases with student’s ability, a grant to a
poor student has higher social benefits than a grant to a rich student, as it
induces smarter students to attend college. When the government’s budget
constraint is not binding, the grant policy must induce the social return to
education to equal the marginal cost of education for the marginal student
at any given level of wealth:
(1 + λ) p[a∗(w)]− c[a∗(w)] = 0, (8)
implying that college education becomes independent of student’s wealth.
Tuition will therefore be uniform. We can see from equation (6) that (8)
requires that poorer students get higher grants. In the more plausible case
where the government budget constraint binds (the shadow cost of public
funds is positive), achieving full equality of education by means-tested gov-
ernment grants is not optimal, and so tuition increases in student’s wealth.
For three reasons optimal government grants decrease with student’s wealth.
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First, as with a non-binding budget constraint, in the absence of a grant some
poor people who do not attend college are smarter than some rich students,
so that the social return to increasing education of the poor is larger. Sec-
ond, because the marginal utility of income declines with income, the poor
respond more than the rich to an increase in government grants. Hence, a
given increase in college participation is attained at lower cost.8 Third, an
increase in the grant to rich students involves a higher budgetary cost than a
similar increase in the grant to poor students, as the rich are more numerous
in college than the poor. In other words, concentrating grant provision on
poor students reduces the government’s cost, as fewer grants are provided to
students who would choose to attend college in the absence of the grant.9
Optimal government grants need not be positive for all students as the
consumption benefit from education induces some students whose private
return to education is lower than tuition to attend college. If, however,
the externalities from education are sufficiently large, social returns exceed
tuition, and optimal grants to all students will be positive.
6 Non-uniform distribution of wealth and abil-
ity
We assumed that students’ ability and wealth are uniformly distributed.
Clearly, relaxing this assumption may affect our results.
Consider first our result on a college’s tuition policy. We saw that, when
education is enjoyable, tuition increases with student’s wealth as rich college
students are on average less smart than poor college students. Clearly, with
a non-uniform distribution, this need not hold. Though the marginal rich
student will have lower ability than poor students, the rich may on aver-
age be smarter than poor students, for instance when students’ ability and
wealth are strongly positively correlated. Then, in the competitive equilib-
rium tuition may decline with wealth. Only when the consumption benefit
from education is sufficiently large, average ability will decline with student’s
8There is some evidence for greater price elasticity of demand for higher education
among poor people, see e.g. McPherson and Schapiro (1991) and Kane (1994). However,
Cameron and Heckman (1999), Dynarski (2000), and Stanley (2003) find no or the reverse
effect.
9This third reason has also been identified by De Fraja (2003) as an efficiency rationale
for reverse discrimination in education.
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wealth, and so tuition will increase with student’s wealth.
Next consider our result on means-tested government grants. When the
government budget constraint does not bind, allowing for more general distri-
bution functions does not affect our result. This is seen by inspecting (6) and
(8). Equation (8) implies optimality requires a∗ to be independent of wealth,
independent of how ability and wealth are distributed over the population.
Equation (6) then implies that grants should decrease with wealth.
Our result on government grants may differ when the government budget
constraint binds. First, the effect of an increase in grants to persons with a
given wealth depends on the density of students at the margin for that wealth,
f [a∗(w), w]. (See the first term in first-order condition (10) in the Appendix.)
Allowing for more general distribution functions implies that this term need
no longer be independent of student’s wealth w. Second, the rich need not
necessarily outnumber the poor in college, and so the cost of inframarginal
subsidies may be higher for poorer groups. (See the second term in first-order
condition (10) in the Appendix.) Thus, the trade-off between increasing the
social benefits from education and the budgetary cost of grant provision may
be affected. Since, at the margin, poorer students are still smarter than
richer students, our main argument, that grants to poorer students have
higher social benefits than grants to richer students, still holds. This is the
more so, the higher is the consumption benefit from education. Hence, when
the consumption benefit from education is sufficiently large, grants will still
decrease with student’s wealth.
7 Conclusion
We showed that the consumption benefit from college may explain why both
college tuition and government grants to college students are typically means-
tested. The general effect we identified can apply in areas outside of college.
We can think of a professional conference. If the intent is to attract people
interested in the contents of the conference, then the organizers may want to
hold it in a location which is unattractive for a vacation. Similarly, consider
the effects of the move of the German capital from Bonn to Berlin. Bonn was
an unattractive location, while Berlin is a highly attractive city in which to
work and live. Therefore, governmental offices in Bonn may have attracted
officials dedicated to public policy; offices in Berlin would also attract peo-
ple who want a government job not because they like the job, but for the
12
opportunity to work in Berlin.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let (1) hold with equality and replace a with a∗. Totally differentiating
with respect to a∗ and w results in:
da∗
dw = −
[1− t0(w)]v0 [a∗ + p(a∗)− t(w) + w]− v0(a∗ + w)
[1 + p0(a∗)] v0 [a∗ + p(a∗)− t(w) + w]− v0(a∗ + w) . (9)
Note that (2) implies that if b > 0, then for all w:
a∗ + p(a∗)− t(w) + w < a∗ + w.
Hence, since p0(a∗) > 0 and v00(·) < 0, the denominator of (9) is always
positive. The sign of the numerator depends on the value of t0(w).
Suppose that t0(w) ≤ 0. Then (9) implies that da∗/dw < 0, and so the
right-hand side of (3) increases with w. Since t0(w) ≤ 0 implies that the
left-hand side of (3) weakly decreases with w, the zero-profit condition (3)
will be violated for some w.
If t0(w) > 0, da∗/dw may be positive, namely when t0(w) is very large, see
(9). This implies that the right-hand side of equation (3) decreases with w.
Since t0(w) > 0 implies that the left-hand side of (3) increases with w, this
cannot hold in a competitive equilibrium. Only if t0(w) > 0 for all w, but not
too large so that da∗/dw < 0 for all w, will both the left-hand side and the
right-hand side of (3) increase with w. Note that t0(w) < 1, because t0(w) ≥ 1
would imply da∗/dw > 0. Note also that 0 < t0(w) < 1 and p0(a∗) > 0 imply
that −1 < da∗/dw < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The government maximizes (5) with respect to g(w) and subject to (3),
(6), and (7). In the optimum, for each w it must hold that:
−da
∗(w)
dg(w) f [a
∗(w), w] {(1 + λ) p[a∗(w)]− c[a∗(w)]− Λg(w)}−Λ
Z Z
a∗(w)
f(a, w)dadw = 0,
(10)
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where Λ is the Lagrange-multiplier for the budget constraint, and
da∗(w)
dg(w) = −
v0 {a∗(w) + p [a∗(w)] + g(w)− t(w) + w}
{1 + p0 [a∗(w)]} v0 {a∗(w) + p [a∗(w)] + g(w)− t(w) + w}− v0 [a∗(w) + w] < 0,
(11)
which follows from (6). For later use, it is convenient to derive how da
∗(w)
dg(w)
depends on w. We can rewrite (11) to:
da∗(w)
dg(w) = −
1
1 + p0 [a∗(w)] + −v0[a∗(w)+w]v0{a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)]+g(w)−t(w)+w}
< 0.
Since p00(a) = 0, we only need to know how the last term in the denominator
changes when w changes. Straightforward algebra shows that since v00(·) < 0
and v000(·) ≥ 0, the last term in the denominator increases in w. Hence, da∗(w)dg(w)
increases in w (is closer to zero, the higher is w).
First consider the case where the budget constraint is non-binding, Λ = 0.
Then, first-order condition (10) reduces to:
(1 + λ) p[a∗(w)]− c[a∗(w)] = 0. (12)
That is, the optimal grant scheme g(w) is such that for the marginal student
from each wealth class, the social return to education equals the marginal
cost of education. Clearly, this implies that in the optimum a∗(w) is inde-
pendent of student’s wealth. Tuition t(w) will therefore also be independent
of student’s wealth, see (3). Totally differentiating (6) with respect to w and
g, keeping a∗(w) and t(w) constant, yields:
dg
dw = −
v0 {a∗(w) + p [a∗(w)] + g(w)− t(w) + w}− v0 [a∗(w) + w]
v0 {a∗(w) + p [a∗(w)] + g(w)− t(w) + w} < 0.
Hence, first-order condition (12) can only be satisfied when grants decrease
with student’s wealth, g0(w) < 0.
Next consider the case where the budget constraint binds. The first part
of first-order condition (10) describes the benefits of increasing grants to
students with wealth w. Starting from any uniform grant scheme, g0(w) = 0,
the marginal benefits of grant provision decrease with student’s wealth w
since:
1) The term in curly brackets is larger for smaller w since a∗(w) decreases
with w, and p0(a) > 0 and c0(a) < 0.
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2) The term f [a∗(w), w] is the same for all w, since students are distrib-
uted uniformly.
3) The term −da∗(w)/dg(w) is larger for smaller w by the concavity of
v(·), as discussed above.
The second part of (10) describes the budgetary costs of increasing grants
to students with wealth w. Starting from any uniform grant scheme, g0(w) =
0, the marginal cost of grant provision increase with student’s wealth w since
a∗(w) decreases with w.
Concluding, starting from any uniform grant scheme, g0(w) = 0, the
marginal benefit of grant provision decrease with student’s wealth, while the
marginal cost of grant provision increase with student’s wealth. A uniform
grant scheme is therefore suboptimal. Optimal grants decrease with student’s
wealth.
15
9 Notation
a Ability
b Consumption benefit of college education
c(a) College’s cost of educating a student with ability a
f(a, w) Density of the population as a function of ability a and wealth w
g(w) government-provided grant to a student with wealth w
p(a) Return to education of college graduate with ability a
t(w) Tuition at college for a student with wealth w
v(·) Utility from income
w Wealth
16
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